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Barnard
Professor Xiaobo Lü Examines Tax Policy in Rural China
and Its Effects on Farmers in New Book
 New
York, N.Y., June 26, 2003–Rural farmers in China are
burdened with high taxes, a harsh consequence of government
decentralization and expanding local control, according to
a new book by political scientists Xiaobo Lü of Barnard
College and Thomas Bernstein of Columbia University.
Lü, director of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute
at Columbia University, said in an interview that the specter
of organized political action by farmers and the fear that
they could dominate urban interests have fueled government
concerns over a loss of control and authority.
The co-authored book, Taxation Without Representation in
Contemporary Rural China (March 2003), highlights the
growing gap in taxation between rural and urban China, where
the latter has largely escaped high levies.
Much has been written about the benefits of government decentralization
and the "local developmental state" in China, especially
in the highly successful coastal provinces. However, contrary
to other recent studies, Lü and Bernstein analyze the
unintended and harmful consequences of these policies on rural
China. They argue that the predatory role of the local state
and its deleterious impact on farmers have largely been ignored.
According to Lü, "The pitfalls of decentralization
stem from the fact that local government ballooned in authority
and size while there is little accountability. The incentives
and expectations of decentralization led officials to impose
excessive and unfair taxes on farmers."
Lü predicts that local government cannot continue as
an economic actor in the next stage of the reform. "Over
the next decade or so, the focus of the reform will have to
change from decentralization and developmental state to reforming
governance – increasing transparency, accountability,
and the rule of law." Lü’s current research
focuses on how the role of government will have to change
from a "player" to a "referee" in the
new game of market economy.
The book provides a thorough examination of how local governments
generated income by disproportionately charging peasants to
modernize their localities. It traces the origins and effects
of ad hoc levies and taxation on agricultural China; discusses
forms of peasant resistance; and analyzes the impact of village
elections and inadequate political representation. Lü
and Bernstein argue that complicated and contentious relationships
among peasants, the central government, and local governments
– combined with legacies of the Mao era – resulted
in an intensive, informal taxation of farmers that lacked
state accountability or authority.
In contrast, urban dwellers benefited from formal taxation
systems and generally did not have to pay arbitrary fees.
"The inequitable taxation of farmers has created a sizeable
and expanding gap between the economic conditions of rural
and urban China today," said Lü.
Although he explains that central government leaders were
strongly concerned with agricultural inequities, Lü posits
that remedial measures and democratic reforms were unsuccessful
in alleviating peasant burdens. To date, the agricultural
sector lacks political strength in policy-making, which is
the by-product of political institutions that systematically
favored the urban-industrial sector and discriminated against
agriculture.
"In order for a peaceful transition to democracy, there
must be an organized political voice among farmers which has
been completely lacking," argues Lü. "The key
to democratization is for the government to lower the stakes
of opening the political process."
Despite significant prospects for democratization in China
today, Lü points out that fears that the collective strength
of the rural sector would destabilize the current balance
of power may restrict greater political participation by peasants
in the near future.
Lü, Associate Professor of Political Science at Barnard
College, is a native of China.
He has written about post-socialist transition, political
corruption and the role of bureaucracy in economic development.
He is the author of an in-depth analysis of Chinese official
corruption, titled Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational
Involution of the Chinese Communist Party, and co-author
of Danwei: Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and
Comparative Perspective. Lü is a member of the Committee
of 100, a prominent Chinese American organization whose members
include cellist Yo Yo Ma and architect I.M. Pei.
Thomas P. Bernstein is Professor of Government at Columbia
University. He specializes in comparative politics, with a
focus on China and communist and post-communist systems. He
has written about social interests and the youth in China,
in addition to democratization and politics of rural change
in Soviet Union and China. He is a member of the Weatherhead
East Asian Institute and joined the Columbia faculty in 1975,
having previously taught at Yale and Indiana Universities.
He serves on the editorial board of China Quarterly
and on the editorial committee of the journal Comparative
Politics.
Contact:
Petra Tuomi, Office of Public Affairs, 212-854-7907, ptuomi@barnard.edu
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