

## POLS BC 1013x: POLITICAL THEORY I

TuTh 10:35-11:50

202 Altschul

### FALL 2002 PACKET: SYLLABUS, LECTURE OUTLINES AND READINGS

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This packet is the key to the course. Please read it carefully and use as indicated. Throughout this course the focus is on the tension between idealism and realism in political theory. The foremost idealist, Plato, is concerned with establishing ideal standards of right conduct in our quest for happiness. Machiavelli, the leading realist, demands that we concern ourselves with what works effectively in a political context. The idealists ask the question, "what course of life is best?" They want us to determine what ethical standards and moral values should direct our lives, by asserting that individual self awareness – to “know thyself” – is the key to justice in the state. The realists reject such ideals, arguing that they are irrelevant to achieving good government. They are pragmatists who seek an expedient result and contend that personal happiness depends on a guarantee of political security or safety. The first part of this course, from the idealism of Hinduism, Confucianism and Taoism, through The Republic of Plato, examines the idealist foundation of political theory; the second part of the course begins with the challenge to Plato by Aristotle and Machiavelli, as critics of idealism.

#### COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

1. An optional midterm exam of 7 short and long identifications, taken from 25 quotations in the assigned readings and distributed a week in advance, will be given in class on October 29<sup>th</sup>. The exam will count for 40% of your course grade, if you choose to take it.
2. A final exam, consisting of 6 identification questions and one essay, again distributed in advance and then given on the date set by the Registrar. The final exam is either 60% or 100% of the course grade. Please see the previous midterm and final exams in this Packet, pp. 23-25, as indicators for this term's exams.

Lectures given on religious holidays will be video-taped and placed on Reserve in the Media Services, Barnard Library, 3rd floor desk.

The following required texts for the course (listed in order of use) may be purchased at either Columbia University Bookstore, Labyrinth Books or Papyrus Bookstore. They are also available on Reserve at the Barnard and Columbia College Libraries. Please read the editions given here because references in the Packet and in lectures are to them.

Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching, edited by Stephen Mitchell (Harper Perennial)

Sophocles, Antigone, translated by Eugene Falk (Addison Wesley)

Plato, The Republic, translated by F.M. Cornford (Oxford)

Aristotle, The Politics, translated by Ernest Barker, ISBN 0-19-500306-3 (Oxford)

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Norton); Mandragola, transl. by Paolucci (Prentice Hall)

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hackett)

J.J. Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings (Hackett)

## PHILOSOPHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF IDEALISM - EAST AND WEST

### SEPTEMBER 3: INTRODUCTION: THE PERSONAL AND THE POLITICAL

The Socratic quest for what course of life is best to gain happiness, based on Plato's dialogues, The Apology, The Gorgias and The Symposium. Packet, pp. 4-5.

SEPTEMBER 5: Light from the East—The beginnings of philosophy in ancient India with Hinduism and Buddhism. The origins of the idea of the quest of the self. Packet, pp. 5-6.

SEPTEMBER 10: Idealism vs. Realism in Ancient Chinese Political Thought. Packet, pp. 6-10.

Reading: Tao Te Ching, edited by Stephen Mitchell.

SEPTEMBER 12: Emergence of political ideas in ancient Greece: the problem of how to handle power as seen through Thucydides' history of Athens and the Peloponnesian War.

Reading: Thucydides, "Pericles Funeral Speech" and "Revolution in Corcyra," excerpts from The Peloponnesian War in Packet, pp. 10, 26-32.

SEPTEMBER 17: Political ideas in Greek drama: Sophocles' expression of the tension between idealism and realism in Antigone; the concepts of nomos and physis.

Reading: Sophocles, Antigone. Packet, pp. 10-11, 32-34, 47-48.

SEPTEMBER 19 TO OCTOBER 15: The archetypal formulation of political idealism by Plato: his assertion of absolute standards of conduct in his philosophy of human nature and the state.

Reading: Plato's Republic, pp. xv-xxix (Introduction by Cornford), 1-235, 264-340. Packet pp. 11-15, 33-48.

## THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL IDEALISM: ARISTOTLE, MACHIAVELLI, AND HOBBS

OCTOBER 17, 22, 24: Aristotle's critique of Plato. The major similarities and differences between Plato, the revolutionary, and Aristotle, the reformer and advocate of "the mean" (a realistic position taken between extremes).

Reading: Aristotle, Politics, pp.1-56, 116-121, 179-84, 279-320. Packet pp.15-16, 48-50.

### OCTOBER 29: OPTIONAL MIDTERM EXAMINATION IN CLASS.

This will select identification questions from those in the study guidelines. Please see sample midterm exam from last year in Packet, pp.23-24, for general format of this exam.

OCTOBER 31, NOVEMBER 7, 12: Machiavelli's decisive break with classical idealism, based on his theories of human nature and security. His realism compared to Plato's idealism in the context of The Prince. His concepts of human nature, power and leadership suggest a "politics of seduction," expressed also in Machiavelli's play, Mandragola.

Reading: Machiavelli, The Prince, chs. 15, 17, 18, 25; pp. 42-43, 45-49, 67-69. And

Mandragola (entire play). Packet pp. 17-18, 51-55.

NOVEMBER 14: Hobbes' extension of Machiavelli's realism based on his theories of human nature, the social contract and the sovereign. The similarity between Machiavelli's and Hobbes' emphasis on the need for security. Hobbes' realism, in contrast to Plato's idealism, asserts that happiness or pleasure depends on a secure state.

Reading: Excerpts from Hobbes' Leviathan and further analysis of Hobbes in Packet, pp. 18-19, 56-67.

### **THEORIES OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY: LOCKE AND ROUSSEAU**

NOVEMBER 19: Locke's theory of liberty or freedom. The relationship of this theory to his central concept of private property. The contrast between the ideas of liberty and equality as they relate to Locke's reformism; the similarities between the reformism of Locke and Aristotle and their differences with Rousseau's idealism.

Reading: Locke, Second Treatise of Government. Introduction, pp.vii-xxi. Preface and text, pp. 5-124. Packet pp. 19, 68-71.

NOVEMBER 21, 26: Rousseau's theory of equality and revolutionary idealism. Its basis in his concept of human nature as expressed in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. The relationship of his theories of human nature and equality to his ideas of the social contract, the general will, the civil state and freedom, as found in his work, The Social Contract.

Reading: Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings. Read first the Introduction, pp. vii-xvii; then his Discourse on Inequality, pp.25-81; finally his Social Contract, Books I, II. pp.141-172. Packet pp. 19-21, 72-78.

DECEMBER 3: Perspectives on Women in Political Theory. Review of this theme throughout the course, with focus on Rousseau. Then an analysis of Mary Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau and her theory of women's rights.

Reading: Packet, pp. 21-22, 79-86

DECEMBER 5: CONCLUSIONS. Summary: Contrasts among Plato's and Rousseau's revolutionary idealism, the realism of Machiavelli and Hobbes and the reformism of Aristotle and Locke.

Reading: Packet, pp. 22, 87-88.

## OUTLINE OF LECTURE NOTES

**FIRST LECTURE : Foundations of Idealism: The Socratic Quest**

Socrates (470-399 B.C.E.) and Plato (428-348 B.C.E.): Philosophers of Ancient Greece, 5th century B.C. Athens. Theories of:

I) **Truth:** in Plato's dialogue, "The Apology" (See Plato, Last Days of Socrates, Penguin), the story of Socrates' trial and defense. Socrates is on a "pilgrimage" or quest for truth to "know thyself." This is discussed also in Plato, Gorgias (Penguin). We will refer to this Socratic approach as "truth pursued" and contrast it to "truth possessed."

II) **Love:** in Plato's Symposium (Penguin)-conversation about love by Pausanias (love as lust), Aristophanes (romantic love), and Socrates ("ladder of love": physical-->romantic-->universal [abstract, Platonic]). See Leo Strauss on Plato's Symposium (Chicago, 2001).

III) **Life of Happiness:** Plato's Gorgias and The Republic (intro., p. xx) suggest life's meaning and direction. The key question is what course of life is best? Socrates and Plato argue for idealism as necessary because humanity needs ideals to provide standards of value, meaning and purpose. The quest is to know oneself and discover a purpose in life. Now is the time (Socrates would assert) to take seriously the idea of life as a journey or quest. In this lies our opportunity for happiness; and the essential idealist imperative is that "the unexamined life is not worth living."

Socrates is a key figure in our analysis of Political Theory for several reasons. Above all, he has served, since Plato's immortalization of him, as an ideal role model of a teacher and a happy individual. Yet the fact remains that history has left scant records of his life. Christian Meier, in a recent study entitled Athens, A Portrait of the City in its Golden Age (London, 1999), has described Socrates in these terms: "Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.), son of Sophroniscus, was the only one to remain steadfast [during the crisis of the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath] as democracy was degenerating into anarchy...He had been a well-known figure in Athens since at least the early 420's, in part because of his notorious ugliness. He dressed simply and was known to move about barefoot. He enjoyed being with people and evoked interest everywhere, especially because he was generally surrounded by a small crowd of acolytes, many of them [like Plato] belonging to the highest circles of Attic society. He fascinated them, and the contrast between him and them must have been striking. His ability to draw people extended to artisans and the plain folk [he himself was a stonemason by trade, like his father]. He talked with them about their work, and sought their opinions about morality, politics, and the issues of the day. He focused entirely on what ordinary people said and thought, and what lay beyond their opinions. He may also have dispensed practical advice, but what is more important is that he felt no need to escape aporia, the state of remaining in doubt. He could not rest until he reached the ultimate truth, a goal in pursuit of which, of course, he never succeeded. If Socrates felt superior to others, it was because he was aware that he might never be able to find answers to the questions he raised. Alone among his fellow citizens, he knew just how little he knew. He surely did not intend this insight to be the end of his quest, but it was apparently as far as he was able to go. He encountered this unknowability again and again, and - unlike the Sophists - kept asking the same questions. This was what made him so unique in Athens. His purpose was elusive. He refused to focus on practical applications of his knowledge. He developed a much-feared dialectic, which we know from Plato's accounts of it. Socrates' method was greatly admired by his listeners but evoked irritation in those subjected to his questions. He would approach others, especially clever Sophists, with humble respect, and ask his questions with admiring naïveté. Frequently, he would agree with what they said, but in his assent and admiration there would always remain a hint of doubt that would, finally, reveal the hollowness of their reasoning. One puzzle in particular preoccupied Socrates. How was it possible for the artisans and

artists [scientists and mathematicians] of his time to have developed such impressive knowledge and master the technical aspects of their trade or subject so perfectly while similar competence was lacking in the political realm?

Where others searched for answers, promulgated laws, he recognized that a much more fundamental approach was needed: Man had to learn first that he knew nothing. His insight into his own lack of ultimate knowledge in no way discouraged Socrates. He regarded it as his duty to keep asking questions, and an inner voice urged him to devote his life to the young people of Attica by involving them in his investigations." (pp. 572-575) The beginning and the end are to "know thyself."

It's admittedly a long way from Plato's dialogues to the lyrics of Michael Jackson, but the essential message does remain clear: "I'm starting with the man in the mirror/ I'm asking him to change his ways/ And no message could have been clearer/ If you wanna make the world a better place/ Take a look at yourself and then make a change." (from "The Man in the Mirror") The personal directs the political.

## SECOND LECTURE : Idealism in Ancient India: Hindu and Buddhist Views of Life

Ideals of Indian philosophy, in Upanishads and Bhagavadgita of Hinduism, from 1500 B.C.E. (Plato lived 428-348 B.C.E.), and in the teachings of Buddha (563-483 B.C.E.).

Four main concepts of Hindu idealism:

- I) Ideal education and educator (**guru**), expressed in Karl Potter Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (1963), ch. 1. Teacher as cognizant of student's needs. Truth pursued, not possessed.
- II) Ideal system of values that education should impart (from Upanishads):
- 1) **artha**: value of wealth and property, pursued in moderation, without greed
  - 2) **kama**: sensual fulfillment, especially sexual pleasure, leading to love, not driven by lust
  - 3) **dharma**: religion, imparting a sense of righteousness and social obligation, self-sacrifice
  - 4) **moksha**: spiritual liberation; freedom from illusion, fear and ignorance; leading to perception of the highest truth, which is the unity of all being, through pursuit of truth

This theory of values insists that all four of those listed constitute broad aims of life. These four are not, however, of equal worth. **Artha** and **kama** are less important than **dharma** and **moksha**, the last being the highest state of spiritual consciousness, when we are "freed from delusion" by perceiving oneself in all being and all being in oneself. (The Bhagavadgita, vi.29)

III) Ideal stages in an individual's life:

- 1) **brahmacharya**: student, the first 25 years of life, devoted to studying all knowledge and understanding the sacred texts of Hinduism. This idealizes the student's pursuit of truth.
- 2) **grihastha**: householder, ages 25-55, establishing a family, devoted to providing for others, raising children; idealization of social responsibility.
- 3) **vanaprastha**: literally "forest hermit" or a solitary seeker of truth. This life stage may begin when one sees "the son of a son," thus ensuring the continuity of the family. The individual now pursues truth in earnest, which must involve leaving all family responsibilities behind in a quest for self-knowledge and freedom.
- 4) **sannyasa**: the final stage meaning "saintliness" that depends upon the result of **vanaprastha**. The person returns to society after having perceived the unity of all being. Thus enlightened by this highest knowledge, the **sannyasin** moves throughout society yet transcends its rules (of caste) and temptations (of wealth, property or sex). The behavior of the "saint in society" is strictly nonviolent, he or she having learned the necessary connection between the highest truth (the identity of

all being, that we are all part of one another) and nonviolence (**ahimsa**). This connection means that if we inflict injury on another, we necessarily harm ourselves.

IV) Ideal relationship between the individual and society (the self and the system), based on theories of human nature and of the way that nurture (education) should develop one's intrinsic nature. This is the essential nature/nurture paradigm developed later by Plato.

Theory of the tripartite self

**sattva**: wisdom, goodness

**rajas**: courage, energy

**tamas**: desire, appetite

as related to tripartite system

**brahmin**: philosopher/priest caste

**kshatriya**: political/military caste

**vaishya**: commercial, agricultural caste

In an ideal self, wisdom controls desire; in an ideal society, brahmins are the highest moral authority. Although the caste system degenerated into an exploitative system based on privilege and heredity, its original, ideal basis was merit. The function of education is to nurture or develop the individual's innate qualities or natural gifts. In these respects, there are close parallels with Plato's theories of self, state and education (packet, p. 44).

### Buddhism

Buddhism emerged in India, as an heretical response to Hinduism, in the 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E., and, in terms of classical theory, made a major contribution to the Hindu concept of ideal stages in an individual's life. It derived this from the story of the life of Gautama Buddha. Buddhism theorized the individual should avoid unnecessary suffering and attain happiness by renouncing the addictions or cravings for acquisition of material objects and domination of others. Buddha's own life was viewed as the model for this, where he evolved through distinct stages of personal development: first, rejection of most conventional goals or desires; second, discovery of personal truth through an introspective journey of progressive enlightenment; and, finally, return to society with these truths to uplift and unify humanity. These three stages have been described in Joseph Campbell, Hero with a Thousand Faces. In the spring semester of Political Theory II, they will be applied to the personal journeys of Malcolm X and Mahatma Gandhi; but their meaning in this course is for the idea of the Socratic quest as Plato conceives it in The Republic, climaxing in the allegory of the cave. Hinduism, Buddhism and Platonism are all concerned with stages of an individual's ideal journey to personal truth and happiness.

Hindu and Buddhist idealism insist on the primacy of individual self-realization: their goal is emphatically liberation of each person, before any society can attain a collective good. Mahatma Gandhi, the quintessential exponent of modern Hindu idealism, was profoundly influenced by Buddhism. He gave this advice to a student: "Please do not carry unnecessarily on your head the burden of emancipating India. Emancipate your own self. Even that burden is very great. Apply everything to yourself. In your emancipation is the emancipation of India." On this central principle, Gandhi, in particular, and Hinduism or Buddhism, in general, share Bob Marley's wisdom: "Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery / None but ourselves can free our minds." (Redemption Song) Idealism has diverse sources and prophets, but they are unified on the goal to "know thyself" because only this may bring happiness. The essential axiom is that "You must become the change that you wish to see in the world." (Gandhi).

### THIRD LECTURE : Idealism vs. Realism in Ancient Chinese Political Thought

If philosophy was born in India, *political* philosophy originated in China. The debate between idealism and realism (characteristic of political philosophy) was fought first in China, a century before it was introduced in Greece. The idealist theory of Confucianism was put into practice as the official creed of the

state from the 2nd century B.C. until early in this century. This meant that for over 2,000 years Chinese civil servants (scholar officials or **mandarins**) were examined on Confucian principles. Never in the West did idealism achieve such power in politics. Even in China, though, Confucianism had contenders, especially the realist philosophy of Legalism. These two schools of thought may be summarized in terms of diagnosis and prescription. Note that this is the fundamental conceptual framework used by all of the political theorists subsequently studied in this course, most emphatically by Plato, but also applied by the realists, particularly Machiavelli and Hobbes.

I. Idealism: Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was born 123 years before Plato, in Shantung province, thousands of miles from Athens. Confucius and Plato, however, had much in common. Both came from states torn by severe social and political conflict. They saw themselves as healers, called to diagnose the causes of their cultural crises and prescribe effective remedies. The diseases that they diagnosed were profoundly political: corrupt politics and civil war. Both tried earnestly during their lifetimes to change their respective political systems, but failed miserably. While Confucius and Plato were unsuccessful at reforming their states, each made a lasting contribution through work as a teacher. Plato's Academy was the first higher level institution in Greece, and Confucius, although lacking an Academy, was canonized for two thousand years as China's "First and Supreme Teacher." (Simon Leys, ed. and trans. The Analects of Confucius, 1997, intro.) Furthermore, Confucius' Analects and Plato's Republic have outlived any political system, thereby testifying to the impact of these two political philosophers.

Confucius began with a golden rule for political life: "Do not to others what you would not want others to do to you." (Analects, XV:23) To infuse humanity into the state he urged rulers simply to "Love men." (XII:22) Unlike Plato, he did not envision women as rulers; but, like Plato, he was an elitist who firmly believed that political evils could be diagnosed and cured best by placing intellectuals in power.

Confucius developed a theory of leadership that idealized the "threefold way" of the philosopher (or scholar official) in authority. He described a superior type of person as ruler: "Being humane, he has no anxieties; being wise, he has no perplexities; being brave, he has no fear." (XIV:30) The philosopher can be trusted with power because of his sublime moral qualities. Personal virtues translate into political qualifications: the educated man is ethical so he alone "practices what he preaches" (II:13); "he reaches upward; the inferior man reaches downward" (XIV:23); "is always calm and at ease; not worried and full of distress" (VII: 36); "understands what is right not what is profitable" (IV:16); "cherishes virtue not possessions" (IV:11); "makes demands on himself not on others" (XV:20); "seeks to enable people to succeed in what is good but does not help them in what is evil" (XII: 16); "is broad minded and not partisan." (II:14) (For an excellent analysis of these ideals and more, see W.T. deBary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. I, Ch.2)

The essence of Confucian idealism as applied to government appears in his advice to rulers: "To govern is to set things right. If you begin by setting yourself right, who will dare to deviate from the right?" (XII:17) "If a ruler himself is upright, all will go well without orders, but if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders they will not be obeyed." (XIII:6) "Lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties and the people will try to keep out of jail, but will have no sense of shame. Lead the people by virtue and restrain them by the rules of decorum and the people will have a sense of shame, and moreover will become good." (II:3) When a monarch asked Confucius, "Suppose I were to kill the lawless for the good of the law-abiding?" he replied, "Why should it be necessary to employ capital punishment in your government? Just so you genuinely desire the good, the people will be good." (XII:19) "A government is good when those near are happy and those far off are attracted." (XIII:16) (W.T. deBary, pp.32-33)

Confucianism was not merely a set of succinct aphorisms; it was a systematic body of political theory. Like the philosophy of Plato, it stressed the virtue of social harmony, idealizing the individual in tune with nature, with family and friends, with the state and with forces of change, in consonance with one's environment. Confucianism envisions 3 ideal types of relationships:

1. Harmony of the self and the state with nature, or "heaven" (**t'ien**). This principle represents God in an impersonal form, as an abstract force or natural power that governs all creation to promote justice and order. In political terms, it became the basis for the idea of the "mandate of heaven" (**t'ien-ming**), understood as a mandate from on high that gave a given regime its legitimacy because it had its sanction from natural or divine law. The Greek idea of **phusis** presented in Sophocles' Antigone (which we will turn to shortly, packet, p.32-34), may be seen as similar to the Confucian idea of **t'ien**. When Creon, featured as the despot in Antigone, violated God's higher law, he lost both his mandate from heaven and his crown. Plato, moreover,

wrote The Republic to show a concordance between **physis** and **nomos**, theorizing how there could be a consonance between natural law and laws of the state. The former, like laws of gravity, are absolute; the latter are relative to time and place, made by mortals, who may be wise or unwise.

2. Harmony of the individual with society by pursuit of the social virtues of benevolence and love of one's community; a sense of humanity (**jen**), and right rules of conduct or propriety (**li**). The aphorisms quoted above from The Analects relate to these values, expressing an ethic of social responsibility and civic duty rather than an emphasis on individual rights and liberties. Plato follows Confucius in this respect and both would have applauded John Kennedy's call for civic duty: "Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country."

3. Harmony of the individual and state with processes of change. This principle dictated that while political and social changes are inevitable and desirable, they should occur gradually and be controlled through education rather than with violent revolution. The Confucian use of the concept **tao**, or the path of right action, expresses this approach to change. For the religious school of Taoism, **tao** meant a path of mystical contemplation and in the writings of the Taoist philosopher Chuang Tzu (369-286 B.C.), politics and government were rejected as unworthy of a virtuous person; right action transcended the state and the only form of significant change was intensely personal and apolitical. Confucius disagreed; he forecast Plato's basic tenet that people are political animals. Hence, a system of state education was indispensable for both personal and political change. For Confucius, **tao** meant understanding and controlling change by teaching the right path of civic virtue.

This system of thought was developed after Confucius by the philosopher Mencius (372-289 B.C.), the most prominent and profound disciple of Confucius. He insisted on the logical relationship of ethics and politics and especially of the need for virtuous responsibility among the ruling elite. When a king asked Mencius to advise him on "some way of profiting" his state, he replied: "What is the point of mentioning the word profit? All that matters is that there should be benevolence and righteousness . . . One who puts benevolence into effect through the transforming influence of morality will become a true King, and his success will not depend on the size of his state. When people submit to force they do not do so willingly but because they are not strong enough. When people submit to the transforming influence of morality they do so sincerely, with admiration in their hearts. Benevolence brings honor; cruelty, disgrace. If others do not respond to your love with love, look into your own benevolence; if others fail to respond to your attempts to govern them with order, look into your own wisdom. In other words, look into yourself whenever you fail to achieve your purpose. When you are correct in your person, the Empire will turn to you" (Mencius, Penguin, 1970, pp. 49, 80-81, 119).

The extraordinary idealism of Mencius is captured by this commentator's observation: "The whole teaching of Mencius centers around the word Goodness. To Mencius, Goodness meant compassion; it meant a feeling of responsibility for the suffering of others." (Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 1939, p. 83) Although such high standards of ethics could not be attained consistently by either individuals or nations, Confucian idealism formulated these ethical standards, argued eloquently for their validity and tried to apply them to the art of ruling. Confucians urged governors to be virtuous because the legitimacy of a state rested on its moral conduct. This insistent connection between ethics and politics linked Confucius to Plato and separated both from the Realists of China and Greece.

II. Realism. In China as later in Greece, a powerful political idealism provoked a strong realist response. Just as Plato's idealism was attacked by a succession of realists from Aristotle to Machiavelli, so Confucianism was countered by a school of realist theorists who called themselves "Legalists," and argued that government is administered better by firm laws than by virtuous men.

As Aristotle was both Plato's best student and sharpest critic, so the chief Legalist theorist, Han Fei Tzu (280-233 B.C.), was a student of the Confucian Hsun Tzu. He used his insider's knowledge of Confucian doctrine to critique it more effectively. The major contention of the Legalist school was that Confucians fail to grasp the forces of power politics and so miss the necessarily coercive role of the state. Against the noble ideals of Confucius they present a tough theory of Realpolitik as uncompromising and rigorous as Machiavelli propounded in The Prince over 1700 years later. The tenets of Han Fei's realism will be stated only briefly here; Machiavelli gives us an opportunity to examine them later at greater length. The main point is to note

the way that this thinking diverges from idealism:

1. Human nature is evil, beyond redemption or reform. While Machiavelli would later call people intrinsically "rotten" (because they are at heart mean and selfish, greedy and unforgiving), the Chinese were first to assert this basic tenet of realism.

2. The direct and inevitable consequence of this individual and collective iniquity is continuing crisis: domestic and international violence or the omnipresent threat of it. Another realist, Thomas Hobbes, called the human condition "a war of each against all." Both Han Fei and Hobbes would have cited the unprecedented violence of the 20th century as undeniable evidence of their realism. Only those unaware of their surroundings or unread in history can miss the infinite capacity of people to harm each other.

3. Virtue in politics is impossible as politics' real love is power; hence Confucian ethics are thought to be misguided and impractical, stemming from an illusory optimism. To understand the art of politics, one must divorce all ethical concerns from government and recognize that whether using shrewd diplomacy or brute force, the ruler should not try to abide by moral principles. Conscience in politics can make cowards of us all. The state is supreme and its authority should be centralized; rulers must be supported unquestionably, uncritically, by a professional administration, police and army. Harsh punishment is good policy. Effective rule demands decisive and determined use of force to maintain order. Capital punishment at home and waging war successfully abroad are desirable tools of a strong state. As Han Fei observed, "To attempt to apply a benevolent and lenient government to the people of a desperate age is almost the same as trying to drive wild horses without reins or whips. This is the affliction of ignorance." Han Fei then proceeded to attack Confucianism at length, demonstrating that, as W.T. deBary concludes, "in their complete rejection of ethical values, in their emphasis on government by law rather than by individual leadership, and in their scorn for the ideals and examples of the past, the Legalists represent the exact antithesis of Confucian thinking." (Sources, I, Ch.VI, p. 123; Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings, trans. Burton Watson [1964])

### III. The Third Way of Taoism: An Idealist Perspective on Political Power, Happiness and the Self

The idealism of Taoism (TAO=DOW, as in Dow Jones) was set forth by Lao-tzu (Lao rhymes with Tao; tzu=zeh), born in China in 604 B.C.E. His only written text is the TAO TE CHING (Dow Deh Jing). The word TAO can be defined as the way or path of right conduct. TE is the power of this way, when followed correctly, and CHING is a classic text on the subject. Thus Stephen Mitchell calls it THE BOOK OF THE WAY. It also could be entitled "The Way to Happiness" (# 9, 44).

The name Lao-tzu (also spelled Lao-tse) means "Old Master;" so unlike other sages such as Confucius or Buddha or Socrates, we know no precise name for this person. Whatever the reason for this anonymity, it has been taken to signify his distinct humility, a virtue that flows throughout his teaching, e.g., # 39, which is mainly intended to set forth individual values.

The idea of WEI WU WEI (pronounced WAY WOO WAY), is defined in Mitchell's Foreword as "doing not-doing." This is a vague definition at best but it is a key concept of Taoism. Mitchell says that while it has been called "passivity," "Nothing could be further from the truth" (p. vii). This observation signals an argument that will be made from now until we consider the ideas of Martin Luther King in April because advocates of nonviolence insist that their ideas are not "passive" but intensely active. Isn't love as strong a force as hate? If so, then why should the ideas that pacifism espouses be seen and dismissed as passive? Gandhi and King both stressed that their nonviolence was not "passive resistance," but extremely active. The first aspect of WEI WU WEI is that "not-doing" means not acting harmfully, violently or wrongly. The meaning of WU WEI is captured in the Beatles song, "Let It Be." The song suggests an attitude toward nature that accepts with awe nature's magnificence, yet is not passive in that acceptance. It does not seek to dominate nature because it embraces its beauty. Taoism would call this attitude one of love and compassion and these are in accord with the primary virtues of simplicity and patience, e.g., # 67. These supreme values guide the self toward awareness.

Mitchell's explanation of WU WEI includes "Lao-tzu's emphasis on softness. Softness means the opposite of rigidity," which should be clear, but then Mitchell adds the synonyms of "suppleness, adaptability, endurance" (p.viii). The virtue of softness is evident in lines such as "The soft overcomes the hard; the gentle overcomes the rigid" (# 78). However, the concept of softness is extended to imply extraordinary power, and this is most apparent in Taoism's awe of the force of water: "Nothing in the world is as soft and yielding as water. Yet for dissolving the hard and inflexible, nothing can surpass it"

(# 78). The Taoists want us to consider carefully the reality and metaphor of water, in terms of its softness and flexibility, its willingness to yield, yet also its immense potential for power. The Taoist imagination is conveyed in large part by this analogy of water because, as they saw it, water usually gets what it wants yet it can seem effortless and endlessly patient. Happiness lies in understanding this individual virtue.

When Lao-tzu writes that “Yielding is the way of the Tao” (# 40), and extols humanity, he can also say that “victory will go to the one who knows how to yield,” (# 69) and “humility gives it its power” (# 66). This is a text on love and compassion, patience and humility. But its argument is that these virtues produce power and with that, happiness, both personal and political. The point may seem paradoxical: “The Tao nourishes by not forcing. By not dominating, the Master leads” (# 81). Leadership is effective because it practices admirable virtues and this theory can be seen as democratic: “The best leader follows the will of the people” (# 68). There is a strong optimism about human nature: “If you want to learn how to govern...you can show all people the way back to their own nature” (# 65). There is a direct and explicit condemnation of violence, advocacy of peace and association of these with self-knowledge and self-mastery in # 30-33, among the most important in the book. Violence does not produce happiness, but note throughout the central preoccupation of Taoism with self-awareness and attaining right values for the self, if society is to improve.

#### **FOURTH LECTURE : Realism in Ancient Greece expressed by Thucydides**

Thucydides (460-400 B.C.E.), Peloponnesian War (Packet, pp. 26-32) as historical background to Plato's Republic (see intro. to The Republic, pp. xv-xvi). Thucydides' realism as counter to Plato's idealism.

1. Athens as a model democracy (packet, p. 26), is represented by Pericles idealism in his funeral oration (packet, pp. 27-30). He expounds the high ideals of Athens: honor, courage, power of empire and democracy, freedom under law; all are values of good citizenship, infused with patriotism. Why was Athens first corrupted and then destroyed?
2. Thucydides realism conveyed in "Revolution in Corcyra" (pp. 30-2). The eventual corruption of Corcyra and all of Greece were due to war, extremism, perversion of language, and lust for power, coming from the destructive passions of human nature. These suggest the **hubris** or arrogance of Athens.
3. Thucydides realism vs. Plato's idealism: They agree on tragic flaws of Athens: democracy and its misguided ideals, sin of **hubris**, evils of war producing extremes, and misuse of power. They disagree on human nature and the beneficent potential of political power. Plato optimistically argued against Thucydides that reason can rule, in both the individual and the state. Plato, unlike Thucydides, will assert that basic change can begin with education.

#### **FIFTH LECTURE : Idealism and Realism in Greek Drama**

Literary background to Plato (428-348 B.C.) in Sophocles' (495-406 B.C.) Antigone (441 B.C.), theories of Law and Leadership or Rule: Antigone and Plato's Response.

I) 3 ideas of law (see Antigone, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 9-12, 17, 21-22, 26, 30; packet, pp. 32-4)

1) Antigone invokes "divine" or "unwritten" laws (**phusis**) against Creon's "edicts" or "temporary measures" (**nomos**), (p. 12; packet, pp. 32, 34).

2) Creon contends that the ruler's word is law and this is supreme (pp. 6-7, 17). This is at first accepted by the chorus (people), (pp. 7, 10-11), but then they affirm "God's law" (p. 30) as ultimate.

3) Plato's rulers discover **phusis** or "natural law" of justice through education, and they try to pattern **nomos** on **phusis**.

II) 3 forms of leadership or rule (see Packet, pp.46-48).

1) Creon = despotic rule, using law as absolute power, (pp. 6-7, 17), illustrated in his view of women, who must be dominated (pp. 13-15, 17). Compare Plato's portrait of the despot, (The Republic, pp. 287-301, 306).

2) Pericles = democratic leadership and rule of law: Athenian values of courage, honor, patriarchy; women as good wives, mothers; family as the basis of the state.

3) Plato's Republic: rule of philosophers, with vision of natural law (**phusis**) ideally informing human law (**nomos**); qualified elite of women and men use law to rule justly, based on rigorous system of education to select intelligent leaders. Plato's theory of these three types of rule will be examined later.

**SIXTH LECTURE** : Philosophy of Idealism in Plato's Republic: 1st of 8 lectures on Sept. 19: intro., pp. 1-14, packet, pp. 33-48. Main theme of the book announced by Cornford at outset (p. xv)

The subsequent series of 7 lectures will follow these segments of Plato's Republic:

9/24: pp. 15-40

9/26: pp. 41-118

10/1: pp. 119-143

10/3: pp. 144-174

10/8: pp. 175-220

10/10: pp. 221-235

10/15: pp. 264-340

I) Plato's thought shaped by:

1) Aristocratic family, rule by "best" (A. E. Taylor, Plato)

2) Example and teaching of Socrates, Plato's mentor when he was ages 18-28.

3) Athenian politics shows crises of war, democracy, problem of power, separation of political thought from action (Republic, Intro., pp. xv-xxix).

Each of the above was both a source of inspiration and a problem for Plato. Although Plato was an aristocrat, he believed that the traditional class-based form of aristocracy was wrong: rule should be based on merit. Further, Socrates inspired him, but his execution plunged Plato into disillusionment. Finally, Athenian politics, provoked Plato yet also frustrated and disappointed him.

II) The Republic (pp.7-14; packet, pp.34-6) begins with question: what is justice? Plato conceives of it as "right conduct." (pp. 1-2; packet, p. 34). Cephalus and Polemarchus propose traditional idea of retributive justice (pp. 7,9,12; packet, p.34), Socrates responds with ideas of:

1) **arete** or inner excellence (pp. 8-9; packet, p. 33)

2) **techne** or skill (pp. 10-11; packet, p. 34)

3) analogy to physician and ideal of non-injury (pp. 9-14; packet, pp. 35-37). Each idea contributes to his philosophy of justice (**dike**), but in this opening segment he offers only an outline of this theory. Note how this theory depends from the start on education of the individual, stressed by Cornford in the first paragraph of his introduction (p. xv).

**SEVENTH LECTURE** : Idealism of Socrates (Soc.) vs. Realism of Thrasymachus (Thra.) on the question: what is justice or right conduct?

I) How can power be wielded justly?

**THRA.**: Justice = "interest of stronger," "might is right," (pp. 15, 18)

**SOC.**: But how does one determine right interest? Are there objective standards? (pp. 20-21). Socrates reintroduces the analogy of the ruler to the physician (pp. 20-29; packet, p. 36).

**THRA.**: Shifts to defend injustice, analogy of ruler to shepherd (pp. 25-26).

**SOC.**: Reasserts analogy to physician (pp. 27-29).

II) What is a just or happy life (p. 30)?

**THRA.**: Expands defense of injustice; "life of unlimited self-assertion" is best (p. 32).

**SOC.**: Appeals to objective standards of good conduct on analogy to music, musician (pp. 32-33); "perfect pitch" of moral behavior.

**THRA.**: Unjust action stronger.

**SOC.**: United action best, based on standards of fairness and non-injury (p. 35).

**THRA.**: Unjust person happier.

**SOC.**: Just life happiest: **arete** and **techné** = **dike** = **eudaemonia** (happiness) (pp. 37-39). Note definition of happiness in Packet, p. 34, and implicit connection with non-injury, pp.36-7.

**EIGHTH LECTURE** : What is human nature and how should it be nurtured to attain happiness?

I) Is a sense of justice innate in us?

1) Glaucon: No, justice is an expedient, practiced against our will; human nature is personified by Gyges, who is selfish, aggressive; lusts for power, and seeks to dominate (pp. 43-45).

2) Socrates: Yes, because:

a) humans have intrinsic social needs, hence a state is natural (pp. 53-57).

b) differences are natural and just, based on ideas of **arete** (pp. 56-57).

c) excessive wealth and war are unnatural, unhealthy (pp. 59-62); a just state avoids them to establish not money but merit as basis (108-09, 111-12).

II) A just state can nurture our nature by developing :

1) A natural elite of philosophical rulers or "Guardians" (pp. 63-66, 106-107).

2) A politically correct education with thorough, explicit censorship. Use of myth or "fiction" (**pseudos**) (pp. 66-80). Three types of **pseudos** (p. 74):

a) absolute or "true falsehood," a "lie of the heart," driven by a "truth possessed" dogmatism.

b) relative or "spoken falsehood," or "white lie," motivated by expediency, pragmatic deception.

c) fiction as myth: this alone is defended by Plato as useful and necessary, because it may be constructed to represent truth, and becomes a key element in his concept of art or drama.

3) Theory of art (**mimesis**) includes censorship (pp. 80, 88-90; packet, 41-43), stressed ideal of harmony (pp. 101-02, 105).

4) Ideal of meritocracy based on nature-nurture theory (pp. 111, 114).

**NINTH LECTURE** : Plato's theory of virtue. The relationship of the state to the individual; Plato's aim is to attain health, harmony and happiness in both.

I) Virtue: 4 cardinal qualities comprise virtues in state and individual (p. 119):

- 1) wisdom (pp. 121-22)
- 2) courage (p. 123)
- 3) temperance or "self-mastery" (pp. 119-120, 124-126)
- 4) justice (pp. 127-129)

II) Human nature: 3 parts of soul or "tripartite self" (packet, pp. 5, 43-4)

- 1) reason
- 2) spirit
- 3) desire, appetite (pp. 129-138, 140, 306-307).

These correspond to 3 orders in the state: philosophers, civil and military service, (these first two orders are both called "Guardians"), and propertied classes.

III) Justice is defined as "rule of reason" in both individual and state (pp. 139-43). Note use of both musical and medical analogies here, drawing on their development earlier: musical, pp. 11, 14, 32-3, 88-90, 101-02, 105, 125-26, 140-142; and medical, pp. 8-14, 20-3, 27-28, 61, 143.

**TENTH LECTURE** : Plato's "three waves" of revolutionary change (see packet pp. 38-39)

I) First wave: equality of male and female rulers (Guardians) (pp. 144, 149-154, 168, 262 and Sarah Pomeroy quotations in packet, p. 40; but note also Plato's sexist references pp. 83, 125, 154, 156, 170-72, 272, 338). This first wave, recognizing equality of Guardians regardless of gender, is analyzed extensively in Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought, part 1 and Nancy Tuana (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Plato.

II) Second wave: abolition of traditional nuclear family and of private property among rulers, and the subsequent creation of an organic community of Guardians (pp. 155-56, 160, 163-166).

III) Third wave: union of political power and philosophy; rule of reason by Guardians (pp. 177-179; also pp. 181, 210 and intro., p.xxv) to attain happiness in state.

**ELEVENTH LECTURE** : Plato's idealism: philosophical foundations of political power

I) Idealism in power:

- 1) What is idealism? A theory of ideal standards to measure human conduct (pp. 175-78).
- 2) Who interprets and applies them? Philosopher-rulers, as in the third wave (pp. 178-79).

II) Plato's theory of the Forms or ideal models of absolute perfection (packet, pp. 39-40):

- 1) understanding of Forms comes from knowledge, not belief (p. 180)
- 2) contrast between power of knowledge and power of belief (pp. 183, 185, 186)
- 3) knowledge is of essences or universals. This knowledge enables philosophers to perceive unity in disunity. Belief is of existence, which sees only plurality (pp. 187-89).

Untrained politicians, with limited vision, cannot see the forest for the trees.

4) only philosophers can have this knowledge and power (pp. 190-93).

III) Plato's theories of Forms, power, knowledge and belief are manifest in 2 analogies:

1) parable of ship of state (pp. 195-96; packet, p. 37)

2) analogy of artist to ruler (pp. 208-09; packet, p. 37-8)

### **TWELFTH LECTURE : How is the philosopher-ruler educated? Stages of cognitive development.**

The ultimate goal of the educational system is to achieve knowledge of the Good, which is the supreme Form or essence (pp. 211-12). Plato uses the analogy of the sun to the Good and of both (the sun and the Good) to the powers of physical and moral vision, respectively (pp. 217-20).

The philosopher acquires moral vision through education. There are 4 progressive stages of cognitive development. These lead to the allegory of the cave (pp. 221-235; packet, pp. 44-45). The 4 stages express the core of Plato's theory of education as well as the qualification process for prospective leaders.

I) "Imagining" or false belief (**eikasia**) (p. 222, 228) or superficial opinion based on tradition. In the subsequent cave allegory, this stage of awareness is analogous to one who views the shadows in the cave as reality, not illusion; as if one thinks that a film or play is the real thing. This is the level of thought of Cephalus and Polemarchus, as traditionalists.

II) Right conviction or true belief (**pistis**) (p. 222, 229), based on common sense but without knowledge. The analogy is to a wider view of the cave, which inspires some critical thinking, e.g. Glaucon's level of thought, which is not fixed or dogmatic but open to Socrates' arguments.

Note that as Cornford indicates, Plato conceives of a "line" or boundary separating belief from knowledge. One needs a leap of consciousness to cross it (p. 222).

III) Abstract reasoning (**dianoia**) (pp.222-23, 229-30) using math symbols. This is the outside of the cave at night, the sight of stars in the allegory. This level of cognition is identified with auxiliary Guardians.

IV) Philosophic understanding (**episteme and noesis**) (pp. 222-23, 230), using the method of the dialectic, gives knowledge of essences. This allows the philosopher-ruler to gain a sense of common interest, and thus to wield power wisely. In the allegory, this stage is analogous to seeing the sun, or perfect moral vision, attained by the highest philosopher-rulers. Each element of pp. 222-23 is related to pp. 227-31, and focuses on two types of power: belief and knowledge (pp. 233-35).

### **THIRTEENTH LECTURE : Right and wrong types of rule for a state and individual**

I) The right use of power in Plato's state is the rule of reason (p. 235; packet, p. 46)

II) 4 wrong forms of rule are (pp. 264-301):

- 1) Timocracy: rule of honor, courage (e.g., Pericles) (pp. 264-65, 271; packet, pp. 46-7). This rule of "spirit" is particularly given to hubris or arrogance of power.
- 2) Oligarchy: rule of money, property, (pp. 273-275; packet, pp. 47-8). This is governed by greed, domination through wealth.
- 3) Democracy: direct rule of ignorant mob (or demos), as in Athens after Pericles, (pp. 280-286); a mindless, irrational majority like those who convicted Socrates.
- 4) Despotism: rule of tyrant (e.g., Creon) (packet, p. 47-8), (pp. 287, 293, 301). Note that oligarchy, democracy and despotism are all seen by Plato as forms of rule of desire. Hubris prevails.

III) When reason rules in individual self, there is a union of freedom and happiness (pp. 301-307, 319).

IV) Conclusion: Plato is the first of the "journey theorists" as he sees life as a Socratic quest, guided by ideals of nature (**arete**) and nurture (**paideia** or education), to attain happiness. When we turn next from Plato's to Aristotle's philosophy, note how their respective theories of happiness contrast.

**FOURTEENTH LECTURE** : Aristotle's critique of Plato through his appeal to moderation or the "mean" and to empirical observation as the basis of reality (Politics, bk.1; packet, pp. 48-50).

I) What is natural?

- 1) development or growth of human associations from male-female unions (pp. 2-3); to family, to village, to state (or **polis**), (pp. 2-5).
- 2) "ruling" and "being ruled" is natural as the basis of the family for master/slave, male-female (pp. 3-4).
- 3) each being or association has a natural end or **telos** (final cause), e.g., an acorn is destined under right conditions to become an oak; a boy then becomes a man and ideally a citizen (pp. 5-6).

II) Focus on women in family hierarchy: a Greek woman is ideally a wife and mother, hence is given the respect accorded to this position. She cannot rule, but at the same time should not be treated as a slave. (pp. 8-13, 32, 35-36; packet, pp. 48, 50). Aristotle carefully presents the relations of females to males:

- 1) superior-inferior relation of male-female; the man is "naturally fitter to command" (pp. 13, 32).
- 2) "different kinds of goodness" for male and female (pp. 34-36).
- 3) soul has two elements, ruling (rational) and ruled (irrational), (pp. 35, 317).
- 4) female's rational element is "inconclusive" or ineffective; it "lacks authority" (p. 35).
- 5) male's "moral goodness" intended to rule; female's to serve (p. 36)
- 6) Aristotle regards this theory as a "mean," which requires reform: in fact, most women were treated as slaves and change is needed to correct this status. We call this, therefore, Aristotle's first "ripple" of change, in contrast to Plato's revolutionary waves (packet, p. 48).

**FIFTEENTH LECTURE** : Aristotle's critique of Plato with his defense of the family

I) Review Plato's 2nd wave: traditional family breeds possessiveness ( The Republic, pp. 155, 163-166; packet, p. 38), Plato replaces traditional family with a community of Guardians.

II) Aristotle's response:

- 1) the family is natural; it satisfies our needs. As an institution, it is part of a natural evolution

from family to villages, and eventually to a state (p. 4). The "family" category subsumes property, slavery, women (pp. 8-36). See reference to Zimmern (in packet, p. 26), who discusses the traditional Greek family.

- 2) Plato's "formula" is "impracticable": it lacks a natural sense of "mine" and feeling of care (pp. 43-44), or natural spirit of fraternity and friendship (**philia**, defined as attachment or affection) fostered by family (pp. 46-47, packet, p. 50)
- 3) Plato goes to extremes, as suggested by these contrasts drawn by Aristotle:

<b>extreme in <u>Symposium</u></b>	<b>Aristotle's mean</b>	<b>extreme in <u>The Republic</u></b>
extreme attachment becomes infatuation, and loss of identity in lover	familial bonds of mutual affection or friendship (see packet, p. 50)	diffusion of attachment among Guardians is "diluted and tasteless"

- 4) Result of weakening natural bonds is civil discord (p. 46) because natural feelings (possessiveness and affection), which unite a family and eventually a state, are lost (p. 47).

**SIXTEENTH LECTURE** : Aristotle's critique of Plato: his 2nd and 3rd "ripples of reform" (see packet, p. 50)

I) Aristotle's "2nd ripple" has 2 parts:

- 1) defense of family (discussed last lecture)
- 2) defense of private property, which consists of:
  - a) defense of slavery as necessary property (pp. 9-11)
  - b) property and wealth are necessary (pp. 18-19), but there should be a limit (pp. 21, 26), or "mean," rather than excessive wealth
  - c) private property should be put partly in common use to avoid excess and promote liberal, generous spirit of sharing or philanthropy (pp. 49-50)

II) 3rd ripple: diffusion of political power and decentralized system of rule. Aristotle opposes Plato's meritocracy with a theory of "polity" or middle class rule (packet, p. 50)

- 1) Aristotle criticizes Plato's excessive unity of ruling elite; he wants "rotation of rule" (pp. 40-42, 51, 54) by equal citizens.
- 2) Plato's state cannot provide happiness because even the Guardians will be unhappy, without property or family (pp. 54-55).
- 3) middle class rule is best, it exemplifies the mean (pp. 180-182, 288).

III) Aristotle's conclusion: Plato is an extremist and idealist, consumed by **hubris**, without a sense of moderation. Aristotle's main concern is with the attainment of happiness by the individual and the state. Note his explanation of his theory of happiness (Packet, pp.49-50).

**SEVENTEENTH LECTURE** : Machiavelli's realism as a response to his historical situation (Italy around 1500 A.D.) and to Plato's idealism (The Prince, ch. 15, pp. 42-43; packet, pp. 51-4)

I) Machiavelli's diagnosis of:

- 5) Italy's political agony: domestic discord and internal weakness, allows it to be victimized, invaded, by strong foreign powers (Spain, France, England, Germany) (packet, p. 51)
- 6) idealism is the cause of this crisis, Plato the problem. Aristotle did not go far enough in his criticism, as politics and morality do not mix; high moral standards are both unrealistic and dangerous. They disarm or inhibit strong action.

II) Machiavelli's prescription (The Prince, ch. 15) is that political leaders abandon all idealism and adopt realism. The goal of personal happiness related to the politics of security.

- 1) know what is "useful," the "real truth," and "real world," not Plato's useless "imagined" republic
- 2) vast "difference" (dichotomy) between "is" and "ought"
- 3) idealism=ruin; realism=salvation, hence must learn "how not to be good"
- 4) beware of virtue and morality; pursue power, security, survival; use manipulation, expediency, pragmatism.

**EIGHTEENTH LECTURE** : Machiavelli's realism expressed in his theories of the prince's use of force and manipulation; the emphasis is on contrasts with Plato's idealism

I) Human nature (ch. 17, pp. 45-47), "men . . . are rotten" (p. 46), also in his other book, The Discourses: "all men are bad." (Packet, p. 54). The lessons that follow from this logic are:

- 1) "men are bad, must be compelled to be good" (packet, p. 53); consequently, use of force is necessary; examples of Cesare Borgia, and of Florence and Pistoia (p. 45).
- 2) This introduces Machiavelli's idea of strategic or "surgical" violence, pp. 47-50.
- 3) "better to be feared than loved," but not hated; thus the Prince should not touch property, or women, (p. 46); examples of Hannibal and Scipio (pp. 46-47), [also, DeNiro's film, "A Bronx Tale"]

II) Leadership, as expressed in the metaphors of the fox (deception) and the lion (brute force), are models of princely behavior (ch. 18, pp. 47-49). The lessons drawn are:

- 1) use force of lion when necessary, examples of Borgia, Pistoia. Leaders must also learn the art of war (ch. 14, pp. 40-41).
- 2) yet, foxiness is superior: "be liar, hypocrite," example of Alexander VI (pp. 33, 48).
- 3) for the masses, what matters are appearances and final outcome, not methods. As a result, the ends always justify the means (pp. 48-49, and Packet, p. 54).

**NINETEENTH LECTURE** : Machiavelli's theory of power

I) 4 faces of power (ch. 25, pp. 67-69; Mandragola and Packet, p.55)

- 1) **Fortuna**, (chance); "like a woman"-"torrential"-wild, irrational, needs control, domination of **virtu** because she "exerts all her power" to create chaos.
- 2) **Virtu** (manly strength, defined p. xviii, packet, pp. 52, 55): masculine power to "beat and bully"; force of lion not fox; "less timid, more brutal, [to] take charge of her more recklessly." (Prince, p.69)
- 3) Callimaco, the foxy male, represents the power of deception and manipulation; as the seducer, he uses trickery but he gives her what she wants and needs (Mandragola, pp. 4, 36, 38; Prince, ch. 18, pp. 47-8).

- 4) Lucrezia, power of beauty, virtue, morality, that invites seduction, but wants to yield to male domination; she welcomes submission (p. 56)
- 5) Conclusion: life is a power play; politics suggest 4 forms of power relations:
  - a) 2 masculine (lion, fox). There is no rape, only seduction, by Prince.
  - b) 2 feminine (the hysterical need control, and the virtuous need seduction).

II) Machiavelli condemns Plato's theories of idealism, human nature and history. Yet he agrees with much of Plato's diagnosis: the illness is serious, a lethal disease of the body politic; bad government is the problem. It demands extensive surgery, which both Machiavelli and Plato conceive of as a large dose of centralized power and strong, unchallenged leadership. According to Machiavelli, Plato's problem is that he suffers from idealism and has no sense of reality; he lives in a world of illusion. Human nature, for Machiavelli, is corrupt. By ignoring history (as Plato does), one trivializes human suffering.

**TWENTIETH LECTURE** : Hobbes' realism, his theories of human nature and power reinforce and expand Machiavelli's theory

Up to this point in the course, we have covered 3 major theorists: Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli. We have called Plato an idealist and revolutionary; Aristotle a reformer, trying to attain a mean of moderation in all things; and Machiavelli, the supreme realist, asking us to leave morality out of politics, to strive for security, and tell it like it is, not as it should be. Now, we extend these 3 schools of thought, (the idealist, reformer, and realist), by using Hobbes to represent further the realist, Locke the reformist, and Rousseau or Wollstonecraft, the idealists. Our concluding lecture, at the very end of the course, will summarize political theory in these terms (Packet, pp.87-88).

As already mentioned, Hobbes' theory represents an extension of Machiavelli's realism. Hobbes is situated in England, in the middle of the 17th century. Events have changed since Machiavelli, who viewed England in 1500 as a powerful enemy. England remained powerful through 1600 and the close of the Elizabethan era, but by 1650 England was plunged into civil war between Catholics and Protestants, between the King and the Parliament. The King, Charles I, was beheaded, and it seemed that chaos ruled the realm. Hobbes saw himself, as political theorists do, as an expert diagnostician with a remedy inspired by Machiavelli (packet, pp. 56-67).

I)Hobbes' diagnosis:

- 1) England's political agony expressed in both civil and international war (packet, p. 56)
- 2) Basic cause: human nature is ruled not by reason but by passions (senses). There are 3 components of human nature that motivate our behavior:
  - a) reason: mere calculator of passions, (p. 59), the least powerful of human drives.
  - b) appetite: especially desire for power (p. 60), but people seek power for security, because they fear harm
  - c) aversion: especially fear of death. This is the most powerful determinant of human behavior (p. 60). See explanation by Strauss (p. 57) and MacPherson (p. 60)
- 3) Hobbes imagines that his diagnosis is confirmed by what he conceives as a "state of nature," our "natural condition." In this state, there is no "common power" so war of "every man against every man" ensues (p. 61).

II) Hobbes' remedy: protection given by the Leviathan, an absolute state. Hobbes based his theories on concepts of natural law (p. 62), contract (pp. 62-3), and an all powerful sovereign (pp. 63-5).

- 1) the aim of sovereign is peace and security; he uses all his power to attain peace at any

price.

2) his sweeping powers are executive, legislative, and judicial-all unchecked. But the sovereign must keep peace or the contract becomes invalid. His power is legitimized by an ability to avoid international and civil war (64-5).

**TWENTY FIRST LECTURE** : Locke's theory as extension of Aristotle's reformism, in contrast to both Machiavelli's and Hobbes' realism and the idealism of Plato, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft.

I) Locke's diagnosis is that the condition of the body politic is not as critical as Hobbes saw it; and since the situation is not critical, only limited treatment is required, in moderation. This view comes from:

- 1) Locke's "insider status" of middle class background that makes him distrust extreme solutions. See Maurice Cranston, John Locke (1985), (packet p. 68).
- 2) this Aristotelian view had respect for existing traditional institutions of family (women), private property, religion, class, as basis of a good society (packet, p. 69-70).
- 3) it produced a theory of limited state power to preserve property rights (Locke, Second Treatise, p. 8).
- 4) Locke's diagnosis confirmed by an optimistic theory of a "state of nature" of free, equal, reasonable men (pp. 8-9, [4-6]). This was in direct contrast to Hobbes' natural state of war, inspired by a grim assessment of the human condition.

II) Locke's reformist but moderate remedy is a limited "civil government" that begins with contract (pp. 12-14 [sections 13-15], 52 [95]) to establish rule of propertied male citizens (intro., pp. xix, 44 [82]). This rule would come from 3 basic reforms:

- 1) the expansion of liberty under civil law and freedom from absolute powers (p. 17 [22-23], 32 [57]).
- 2) protection and preservation of private property, which is God-given to the industrious in unequal amounts (pp. 21 [34], 29 [50], 31 [54], 66 [124])
- 3) establish, maintain, legislative power (parliament) (pp. 69-75 [134-138, 142]), to maintain property rights by law against despotism (pp. 89 [171], 111 [222], 121 [239], 123 [240]).

III) Locke's reformist approach was infused by a strong spirit of moderation and common sense.

**TWENTY SECOND LECTURE** : Rousseau's revolutionary idealism in contrast to Locke's reformism, Machiavelli's realism, and as a return to the spirit of Plato.

I) Historical background: Rousseau as prophet of the French Revolution's ideals of freedom, equality and community (packet, pp. 68-72)

## II) Rousseau's diagnosis:

- 1) human nature ("natural man," "the human soul") is basically benign, endowed with two natural impulses (Discourse on Inequality, pp. 33, 35-36):
  - a) the first is self preservation; unlike Hobbes, Rousseau believes that self-preservation depends on mutual aid.
  - b) compassion/pity is the second impulse, which translates into the principle of non-injury (packet, pp. 76-7). The second impulse then reinforces the first.
- 2) but our nature has become corrupted by selfishness, evident in:
  - "political inequality," creating class privilege (pp. 37-38)
  - a) "natural pity (compassion)" is overtaken by cold, heartless, "reason" that reinforces "egocentrism" (pp. 53-54) and rationalizes away our instinctive sense of caring
  - b) expressed in "Kitty Genovese syndrome" of "bad samaritanism" (pp. 54-55; packet, pp. 73-4)
  - c) which prevents "mutual preservation" of society (p. 55)
- 3) For Rousseau the problem is The Kitty Genovese syndrome: alienated, isolated individuals in a society without community (last lecture). His solution is the development of a political community (packet, p. 76).
- 4) Rousseau's diagnosis is that the cause of the problem is due to social and economic inequality, reinforced by private property (Discourse, pp. 60, 68, 70, 81), expressed in domination/submission or the "master/slave" mentality (Social Contract, pp. 141-46).

## TWENTY THIRD LECTURE : Rousseau's prescription, and vision of a civil state.

- I. Rousseau's prescription is the social contract (or compact) and "general will" (Contract, pp. 148-150, 153-155; packet, pp. 72, 75-6). The purpose of the social contract (pp. 148-49) is to create a secure, unified, free, and equal community by invoking the "general will." Elements of the "general will" are that it:
  - 1) creates a sense of organic community, an ideal of non-injury (p. 150)
  - 2) represents the "common good, common interest against the inequality of private will and interest," hence it promotes equality (pp. 153-54)
  - 3) it is not the "will of all" or "majority decision" but a moral ideal (p. 155); packet, p. 75).

Definition of general will: a spirit of community that fosters a social bond of public interest and civic virtue, allowing citizens to express their highest aspirations to achieve a state of equality and justice for all. The realization of the general will liberates us to achieve our full potential as social beings, citizens of a political community.

## II. Rousseau's vision of 3 states (packet, p. 78).

- 1) The first was the benign, natural state of nature, in which people are compassionate but corruptible, "stupid." In this first state, people have "natural liberty" (p. 151), but not moral, positive freedom.
- 2) The second is the corrupt modern state, which allows for inequality and slavery; it is ruled by

"private interests," "private will," and "bad government." (p.153)

- 3) The third and final will be the ideal "civil state," which is defined by the following:
  - a) elevation of human consciousness, especially of reason (pp. 150-51, 163). Note that reason now assumes a positive form, enabling the liberation of self.
  - b) based on a social contract that invokes the general will (packet, p. 75).
  - c) small, organic community (pp. 150, 167)
  - d) moral, civil liberty realized (pp. 150-51). In contrast to Locke's idea of freedom, Rousseau's concept of "moral liberty" means liberation of self to attain sense of civic virtue
  - e) equality with freedom (pp. 153-4, 170)
  - f) public property (pp. 151-52)
  
- 4) The spirit and purpose of the civil state: to create a political community governed by a general will; thus enabling every person's self interest to identify with a common interest, so that "we voluntarily will what is willed by those whom we love." (packet, p. 76)

<b>TWENTY FOURTH LECTURE : Perspectives on Women in Political Theory (Packet, pp. 79-86)</b>
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I) Review of perspectives on women throughout the course:

- 7) Ideas of women introduced in Fifth lecture within the context of three forms of leadership, the contrasting ideas of Sophocles' Creon, Thucydides' Pericles, and Plato (Lecture Outline in Packet, p. 11; Pericles' comments on pp. 29-30; and Plato's "first wave" noted in Packet, pp. 13, 38, and Republic, pp. 149-155).
- 8) Further contrasts with conceptions of women in theories of Aristotle (Packet, pp. 15, 48-50, and Politics, pp. 13, 32-36, 317); Machiavelli (Packet, pp. 17-18, 55; Prince, ch. 25; and Mandragola, pp. 4, 36, 38, 56), and Locke (Packet, p. 19, and Second Treatise, p. 44).

II) Rousseau's paradoxical position: a revolutionary idealist – but for men only (Packet, pp. 79-86)

III) Theory of Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), English educationalist and writer, author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792); she is called "the first major feminist" and her work, "the feminist declaration of independence" (Intro. to Penguin ed., p.1).

- 1) Wollstonecraft, a revolutionary idealist, compared with Plato and Rousseau. Like Plato, emphasized the indispensable role of education in political change and included women in the revolution; unlike him, she believed in equality for all men and women. Like Rousseau, she despised aristocratic claims to privilege, stressing an egalitarian vision of the future, including a radical defense of the French revolution. Unlike Rousseau, Wollstonecraft was not only a revolutionary but a revolutionary feminist [see Gary Kelly, Revolutionary Feminism. The Mind and Career of Mary Wollstonecraft, (1996), esp. ch.1, and Janet Todd, Mary Wollstonecraft. A Revolutionary Life (2000)]. Thus she rejected absolutely Rousseau's ideas of female inferiority and submission to men.
- 2) This analysis of Wollstonecraft's theory concentrates on her critique of Rousseau's idea of women and her consequent statement of the rights of women. It is noteworthy that she can fervently admire much of Rousseau's radicalism while rejecting completely his views on women as outrageously reactionary. As the Excerpts from her Vindication of the Rights of Women in the Packet (pp. 83-86) illustrate, she directs her attack on Rousseau's principal treatise on education, Emile, and its leading female character, Sophie. Rousseau's beliefs on how women should be educated are elaborated here. Against Rousseau's arguments that

women are naturally inferior and meant to submit to male domination, Wollstonecraft asserts that women's shortcomings are the consequence of the system of patriarchy and not any inherent or biological weaknesses; that, in fact, education in rationality is sure to rescue women from their unequal status if only they are given a fair opportunity. (In addition to the excerpts from Wollstonecraft's Vindication, see those from Miriam Brody's introduction to the Penguin edition and from Susan Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (1979) in Packet, pp. 80-82)

IV) Three theories about women in Western political thought:

- 5) Women are inferior to men because they are irrational and require male domination at home and in the state. This is the conventional, accepted view of all theorists except Plato: Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke, and Rousseau, with support from figures like Pericles and Creon.
- 6) Sex is irrelevant to politics, only intellect matters. Women, by nature, may be qualified to rule with reason. Thus, they should be educated to test their potential for political office. Only those who have merit are selected, so this is not a theory of sexual equality, but of meritocracy, expounded by Plato.
- 7) Sexual equality and freedom for men and women, educating both sexes to achieve true partnership. Reason is the supreme value, cultivated in both sexes. Mary Wollstonecraft.

**TWENTY FIFTH LECTURE** : Conclusions: realists, reformers, idealists--their perspectives on power (packet, pp. 87-8)

- I) Realists (Machiavelli, Hobbes) use political power to protect people and guarantee their security; in times of crisis, the state should provide a strong, ample, centralized authority, used decisively, without checks and balances, to attain order, ensure public safety and defend its borders.
- II) Reformers (Aristotle, Locke) contend that power corrupts, and absolute, centralized political power corrupts absolutely. We must not sacrifice individual liberty for arbitrary, social control. The solution is to develop laws and preserve institutions that foster freedom and protect property; order depends on respect for diversity of traditional institutions, such as family, religion, and private property.
- III) Idealists (Plato, Rousseau and Wollstonecraft) prescribe power to transform and revolutionize, thereby creating a political community. Whether power comes from Plato's ideals or Rousseau's general will, one must learn how to use power wisely. Moral standards determined by reason, justice and compassion are crucial. One should never underestimate or devalue the power of ideals to attain a higher quality of life.

## SAMPLE MIDTERM AND FINAL EXAMS

THE EXAMS BELOW WERE GIVEN PREVIOUSLY; NONE OF THE QUOTATIONS HERE WILL BE REPEATED THIS YEAR. THE FORMAT WILL BE SIMILAR FOR THE MIDTERM, BUT THE FINAL EXAM WILL BE DIFFERENT BY INCLUDING BOTH ID'S AND AN ESSAY. THERE WILL BE NO EXAM REVIEW SESSIONS. PASSAGES FROM THE ASSIGNED READINGS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED IN ADVANCE THAT WILL INCLUDE THE QUOTATIONS FROM WHICH THE IDENTIFICATION QUESTIONS WILL BE TAKEN FOR BOTH EXAMS. THE ESSAY QUESTION ON THE FINAL EXAM WILL ALSO BE DISTRIBUTED IN ADVANCE.

### MIDTERM EXAM

Please note that the exam is divided into short and long identification questions, each counting 10 and 20 points respectively. The maximum suggested length of answers for short ID's is one page of a blue book, for long ID's, three pages (about 100 and 300 words respectively), but there is no penalty for exceeding this.

For each identification, give the author and title of the text quoted (worth two points each), and then explain the significance of the quotation or the main points associated with it. When writing on the significance, the more precise your explanation, the better. An exact explanation of the context of the quotation is crucial. If you should miss the author and title, then partial credit is not given for significance because the context will not be precisely identified.

SHORT IDENTIFICATIONS (each counts 10 points, a total of 40 points maximum for all):

1. "These divine laws are not just temporary measures. They stand forever."
2. "...it is a general law that there should be naturally ruling elements and elements naturally ruled."
3. "Violence, even well intentioned, always rebounds upon oneself."
4. "...you have only to consider the power which our city possesses<sup>1/4</sup>"

LONG IDENTIFICATIONS (20 points each, total of 60 points maximum for all):

1. "They set about fighting for power, and this internecine conflict ruins them and their country."
2. "How would it be if the captain of a ship were appointed on a property qualification, and a poor man could never get a command, though he might know much more about seamanship?"
3. "Rather they will all, so far as may be, feel together and aim at the same ends, because they are convinced that all their interests are identical."

### Answers for Midterm Exam (explanation of the context is given in the briefest form)

SHORT ID ANSWERS:

1. Sophocles, Antigone (see Antigone, p. 12, and Packet, pp. 11, 32-34). Context: Antigone, after confessing her defiance of Creon's edict, appeals to "divine laws" (physis), as opposed to Creon's unjust measures (nomos). Please note that in this case, as with all the answers to both the midterm and final exams, the lecture outlines provide the key to the answers by indicating how the relevant text should be employed. Thus, the answer should follow the appropriate points in the 5<sup>th</sup> Lecture Outline, p.11, #I: 1, 2. This requires a clear explanation of the meanings of physis and nomos as defined in the Packet (34) and then as related to the play. It is not necessary to compare or contrast these concepts with Plato's theory.
2. Aristotle, Politics (see Politics, pp. 35-36, and Packet, pp. 15, 48-50). Context: Aristotle's theory of the nature and role of women in the polis. The required points are given in the 14<sup>th</sup> Lecture Outline (p. 15): two elements of soul, ruling (rational) and ruled (irrational); female's rational element is "inconclusive" or ineffective, lacking authority; this indicates a different type of "moral goodness" for male (to rule) and for female (to serve). This accords with Aristotle's theory of the "mean," which requires reform, treating women not as slaves but as respected wives and mothers in a traditional family.
3. Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching (see Tao Te Ching, # 30, and Packet, pp.9-10). Context: Taoist ideas of violence, non-violence and power. As explained in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Lecture Outline, violence is condemned, peace and nonviolence are strongly advocated, and the latter are associated with the quest for self-knowledge and self-mastery. Note how the outline draws attention to #30-33 as "among the most important in the book," again underscoring the importance of using the lecture outlines as a key to exams. The outline further explains the Taoist theory of Wei Wu Wei as advocating not a passive but "intensively active" approach to life, thus suggesting the concept of power, as implied in the metaphor of water, the soft overcoming the hard (Packet, pp.9-10).
4. Thucydides, "Pericles Funeral Oration," in The Peloponnesian War (Packet, pp. 27-30). Context: Pericles' hubristic praise of Athens' democracy, value system and imperialism as it entered the war with Sparta. Focus on Pericles' idea of power, as suggested in the 4<sup>th</sup> Lecture Outline, p. 10. Pericles is portrayed as committing the sin of hubris (arrogance) for his belief that Athens has learned how to wield power wisely (Packet, p. 32). It is

not essential to discuss Plato's theory.

#### LONG ID ANSWERS:

1. Plato, Republic (see Republic, p. 235, Packet, pp. 14, 45). Context: conclusion of the allegory of the cave. Explain this allegory briefly, that the cave is a metaphor of the human condition, the way out of the cave suggesting the journey from false belief to knowledge. It is most essential to explain clearly Plato's theory of the two types of power, i.e., of belief and knowledge. "They" in the quotation signifies the unenlightened politicians who use power of belief. Explain this idea by referring to the quotation and contrast with a full explanation of the power of knowledge.
2. Plato, Republic (see Republic, p. 275, Packet, pp. 14-15). Context: Plato's critique of oligarchy, as a form of government that is one of the 4 wrong types of rule. His theory of oligarchy should be placed in the overall context of the decline of the state, from the ideal of the Republic, then to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. Only oligarchy should be explained in detail as the rule of wealth or of irrational appetite and desire. This particular quotation should not be confused with Plato's "ship of state parable" (pp. 195-196). The relevant quotation here suggests that it is a mark of the unjust oligarchic state that a ship's captain, analogous to a political ruler, may gain political power through the corrupt means of money rather than through knowledge. The answer should include both a specific analysis of Plato's critique of oligarchy as a wrong form of rule, based on the power of wealth and not reason, as well as his idea that a ruler should attain power by virtue of his/her merit, with opportunities open to members of any class.
3. Plato, Republic (see Republic, pp. 163-66, Packet, pp. 13, 38). Context: Plato's theory of the "second wave" which advocates abolition of the traditional institutions of nuclear family and private property, followed by the creation of an organic community of "extended family" of Guardians. This quotation comes at the end of the second wave, where Plato theorizes the ideal common interest fostered by the organic Guardian community. The concept of "interest" is important because it answers the early argument of Thrasymachus that the state can achieve only a narrow interest of rule by the stronger party. The Guardians can realize a common interest because in them reason rules.

FINAL EXAM
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Note that this exam is divided into two parts: short and long identification questions. In each part, give the author and title of the text quoted. Then explain the significance of the quotation or the main points associated with it. When explaining its meaning, be as precise as possible by placing it in the specific context of the reading. This is essential. The maximum suggested length of an answer for a short identification is one page of a blue book (one side of page), and for a long identification, three pages. There is no penalty for exceeding the maximum.

#### SHORT IDENTIFICATIONS (5 points each, total of 25 points):

1. "...the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to *preserve and enlarge freedom*"
2. "There's nothing so disastrous as anarchy."
3. "The soft overcomes the hard; the gentle overcomes the rigid."
4. "I do not wish women to have power over men; but over themselves."
5. "...and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

#### LONG IDENTIFICATIONS (15 points each, total of 75 points):

1. "The life of true philosophy is the only one that looks down upon offices of state"
2. "There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will."
3. "...the man succeeded best who knew best how to play the fox."
4. "It is as if you were to turn harmony into mere unison, or to reduce a theme to a single beat."
5. "And it will be the business of reason to rule with wisdom and forethought on behalf of the entire soul."

#### ANSWERS FOR SHORT ID's (scoring a maximum of 5 points each, 4 of them for author/title):

1. Locke (no first names required), Second Treatise of Government. Context: his defense of both law and freedom, or more precisely, of liberty under law, which demands freedom from absolute or arbitrary power. It is essential to connect freedom and law, as the quotation suggests, but not to mention either property or the power of the legislature.
2. Sophocles, Antigone. Context: Creon, defending his condemnation of Antigone by appealing to obedience, authority and discipline; portraying anarchy as the worst of political evils.
3. Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching. Context: Taoist theory of the strength of softness, the power of gentleness or of

yielding. Not necessary to mention the metaphor of water. 1 point deducted, if the idea of where power lies is missed.

4. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Context: she is arguing for the emancipation and empowerment of women. 1 point deducted, if her opposition to Rousseau's sexism is missed.
5. Hobbes, Leviathan. Context: his theory of the state of nature, the grim condition of humanity in which each is pitted against all. 1 point deducted, if his realism is not mentioned.

ANSWERS FOR LONG ID's (maximum of 15 points each, but still 4 for author/title):

1. Plato, Republic. Context: essential to identify that this quotation comes at the end of his allegory of the cave. 5 points deducted if this is not clearly stated somewhere in the answer. This should focus on Plato's idea of power, contrasting power of belief versus power of knowledge. However, it should extend this conceptualization by discussing Plato's "stages of cognition" (p. 222 and Packet, 12<sup>th</sup> Lecture Outline, p. 14). In this conceptualization, the power of belief is associated with the stages of eikasia and pistis, and then power of knowledge evolves after "crossing the line" and gaining awareness of dianoia, episteme and noesis. The Greek words are not essential but their equivalents should be explained. 5 points deducted if there is no mention of the stages of cognition and up to 5 points if they are not adequately explained.
2. Rousseau, Social Contract (or The Basic Political Writings). Context: Rousseau's discussion of the general will. This must be defined. An acceptable definition is found in Packet, p.20 (23<sup>rd</sup> Lecture Outline, #4). The sense of this idea must be conveyed, and if it is not, up to 8 points are deducted. Then the idea of the "will of all" and the difference between it and the general will must be explained. The will of all may not accord with the general will when it is merely a collection of separate unenlightened individual opinions. In the example of the Kitty Genovese case (Packet, pp. 73-74), the 38 witnesses represent the will of all but not the general will, the latter demanding that they come to the aid of the sufferer. It is not necessary to mention the case, but 3 points are deducted if the distinction between the general will and the will of all is not explained.
3. Machiavelli, Prince. Context: Machiavelli's theory of power, expressed in this quotation from ch. 18, relating to the power of the fox, that is, of deceit and craftiness. The metaphors of both lion and fox, introduced in this chapter, should be explained, pointing out that Machiavelli awards superior power to foxy deceit and manipulation, the art of politics and the values of expediency or pragmatism. In this context, the example of the Pope, Alexander VI, is mentioned as one who constantly and effectively used deceit to enhance his powers. Further, in the context of the Mandragola play, the character of Callimaco should be cited as an example of the seductive power of the fox (see Packet, pp. 17-18 for explanation of Machiavelli's theory of power). 5 points deducted if the powers of the lion and the fox are not explained, including the superior power of the fox, of politics as more decisive than mere military might. Another 2 points deducted if the example of Alexander VI is missed and another 2 points if Callimaco is not explained. It is essential to interpret this quotation as a comment on Machiavelli's theory of power, so 2 points are deducted if this isn't stressed.
4. Aristotle, Politics. Context: this signifies Aristotle's criticism of Plato's excessive unification of the state. Since Plato's position is part of his "third wave," we've referred to Aristotle's argument as his "third ripple" (see Packet, p. 16, 16<sup>th</sup> Lecture Outline). The answer should explain the 3 components of Aristotle's critique given in this lecture outline: 1) Aristotle counters Plato's centralization of power in a ruling elite with the assertion of "rotation of rule" by equal citizens; 2) the answer may state either Aristotle's argument that such concentration of rule is "dangerous" because it will cause discontent, or that it will cause unhappiness for everyone, including the Guardians, because they will be deprived of family and property; 3) Aristotle's advocacy of middle class rule because it exemplifies the mean. 5 points deducted if the context of Aristotle's third ripple (this term is unimportant as long as the meaning is there) is missed. 2 points each deducted for the three parts of Aristotle's argument.
5. Plato, Republic. Context: Plato's definition of justice as an "internal order of the soul" (pp. 139, 142). The answer should have the following components: 1) give proper context, relating to justice (3 points deducted if not mentioned); 2) explain Plato's theory of the tripartite soul (see Packet, p. 44, column on left) and make the connection with his corresponding theory of how the tripartite soul is the microcosm for the macro of the ideal state (column on right). These respective components should be clearly stated. The other elements of the chart on p. 44 (e.g., metaphor of the charioteer or myth of the metals) are optional. The 3 "virtues" (wisdom, etc.) should not be confused with the "parts of the soul" (reason, etc.). 5 points deducted if the tripartite soul is not explained exactly with the corresponding parts of the state. 3) the concept of the rule of reason set forth in the quotation should be stressed at some point in the answer. 3 points deducted if this isn't recognized. If, however, the answer explains the myth of metals or metaphor of the charioteer, then this may be considered sufficient for an explanation of the rule of reason.